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Abstract 
In this paper we study recent developments in the approximation of the spread option pricing. 
As the Kirk’s Approximation is extremely flawed in the cases when the correlation is very high, 
we explore a recent development that allows approximating with simplicity and accuracy the 
option price. To assess the goodness of fit of the new method, we increase dramatically the 
number of simulations and scenarios to test the new method and compare it with the original 
Kirk’s formula. The simulations confirmed that the Modified Kirk’s Approximation method is 
extremely accurate, improving Kirk’s approach for two-asset spread options. 
Keywords: Spread options; Spark spread options; Kirk’s formula, Modified Kirk’s formula. 
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I. Introduction. 
With the increasing sophistication of the financial markets and the surging popularity of the 
energy markets, innovative methods are needed, to be able to understand the inherent risks of 
new financial products, and to be better positioned to manage new uncertainties. This paper is 
devoted to the study of the spread options in the context of the energy markets, by studying the 
modification of the classical Kirk’s Approximation, presented by Alòs and León1. While the 
Modification of the Kirk’s Approximation, presented a simple, but a very accurate method to 
approximate option prices, the original paper, introduced few examples and simulations to 
analytically study its goodness of fit. For this reason, the authors want to expand the examples 
and trials of the original papers, to assess the behavior of the Modification of the Kirk’s 
Approximation in a wide range of cases and situations. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we will expose the regulatory 
framework of the energy markets, in particular, the electricity market in the European Union, 
starting with the evolution of the regulation. Section 3 introduces the determinants of the 
electricity price volatility by analyzing the demand and the supply in the case of the electricity 
markets. Section 4 is devoted to derivatives, particularly options, as financial instruments which 
allow us to hedge the inherent volatility of the electricity price. Section 5 explains the latest 
development of the further deregulation of the energy markets, and to be precise, the electricity 
markets, by the European Commission. 
In section 6, we introduce the general pay-off form of options with random strikes, such as two-
asset spread options. We continue in section 7, with a brief review of the Margrabe’s formula, 
which we will see later in the section that it is a special case of the Kirk’s Approximation, 
discussed there. We add in section 8 the framework and the definitions of the Modified Kirk’s 
Approximation. Finally, in section 9, we introduce the Monte Carlo simulations, in order to be 
able to compare these to the results obtained by the Kirk’s Approximation and the Modified 
Kirk’s Approximation. Here we introduce more trials, and scenarios, and we compare the errors 
of the Kirk’s formula to the Modified Kirk’s formula to assess the goodness of fit of the latter. 
An Annex with the key parts of the code is added after the delivery of the conclusions. 
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for random strike options and applications to option pricing approximation. Quantitative 
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II. Regulation of the energy markets (focus on the electricity market) 
Historically, the energy market and, in particular, the electricity market, have been under the 
control of the State. However, in the 1980s a wave of deregulation emerged. Specifically, in the 
early 1990s, the European Union (onwards, EU) started to pass directives in order to deregulate 
or liberalise the electricity market, i.e., open it to competition. This would generate an efficient 
and integrated energy market that, in turn, would bring about the so desired single market. 
Moreover, the more competition is introduced within the EU, the more this market will be able 
to compete with other markets (and so the EU’s economy will be enhanced. Thus, complying 
with the Lisbon Strategy’s 2000 aim)2.  
The purpose of the Single European Act of 1987 to reach a single market carried with it the 
need to deregulate the energy market. However, it was with the publication of the 1995 Green 
Paper on energy policy when the European Commission clearly took a stand regarding the 
energy market; it went for deregulation. Thus, in the next years (1996, 2003 and 2009) three 
European directives were passed in order to liberalise the electricity market.  
In this sense, opening the electricity market to competition does not only imply moving away 
from public ownership of electricity assets towards more private involvement. It also requires 
unbundling generation and supply activities from transmission (where the power is transferred 
over a high-voltage net) and distribution (where the power is transferred over a low-voltage net) 
services. That is, real competition ought to be promoted in all sectors of the physical electric 
network. For instance, if generating and retailing companies are not on equal footing to have 
access to the network, then they won’t have the same opportunities to place their product in the 
market. Therefore, equal and non-discriminatory access to the network should be guaranteed.  
To this end, the European directives of 1996 and 2003
3
 promoted legal and functional 
unbundling of transmission and distribution networks from activities of generation and supply. 
Moreover, independent, impartial and transparent regulatory agencies were created at the 
national level so as to ensure that the tariffs imposed by transmission and distribution operators 
to third parties – in order to get access to the network – are non-discriminatory. These tariffs 
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 Dorsman, A. B. (2011). Financial aspects in energy: A European perspective. Heidelberg: 
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3
 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 
3
 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and Directive 2003/54/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity and repealing the former.  
ought to be cost-reflective, i.e., they shall allow to recoup the costs of operation, to maintain the 
network and to carry out the necessary investments in order to assure the viability of the 
network
4
. In this regard, the reliability of the network is crucial, so as to ensure that the power is 
transferred to where it’s needed and to fully exploit the generation and supply capabilities5. 
Furthermore, the national regulatory authorities enjoy a margin of discretion when assessing 
costs incurred and claimed by transmission and distribution operators. In sum, these authorities 
can consider that some of the costs claimed could be avoided, and so the tariffs shouldn’t reflect 
them. Thus, they boost network operators to keep avoidable costs down and to be more 
efficient.  
Later, the European directive of 2009
6
 introduced important changes as regards with unbundling 
of transmission and distribution networks from activities of generation and supply and, on the 
other hand, with reference to national regulatory agencies. In connection with the former, it 
established ownership unbundling of transmission system operators. This implies the 
appointment of the network owner as the system operator and its independence from any supply 
and production interests. Moreover, the same person should not be a member of the managing 
boards of both a transmission system operator or a transmission system and an undertaking 
performing any of the functions of generation and supply. Nevertheless, the directive 
maintained legal and functional unbundling of distribution system operators, as the scope for 
discrimination as regards third-party access is less significant.  
Secondly, and turning to the national regulatory agencies, the directive’s purpose was to 
harmonise their powers throughout the member states and to strengthen their independence 
from government. Furthermore, it should be noted that these public agencies, thanks to the new 
legislation, would be empowered to refuse certification to transmission system operators when 
network activities and generation and supply activities do not remain independent from each 
other, i.e., when these operators do not comply with unbundling rules.  
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 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
2003/54/EC.  
However, despite the European directives’ aim of achieving a single energy competitive market, 
currently the EU electricity market is, in part, still regulated. Specifically, in most of the EU 
Member States, the electricity generation market (wholesale market) is open to competition, 
whereas the electricity supply market (retail market) is subject to regulation. Indeed, if we 
compare it with the US regulation system of the electricity sector, the same picture is displayed. 
That is, the Federal government has deregulated the wholesale electricity market, but most of 
the States still fix the retail sales
7
.  
On the other hand, it should be noted that it’s not economically feasible to build competing 
networks to serve the same customers. That’s the reason why the networks transporting 
electricity (transmission and distribution) are considered natural monopolies. Therefore, the goal 
of creating a competitive electricity market ought to be restrained to the services activities 
(generation and supply)
8
.  
At present, Member States regulate the supply electricity market on basis of article’s three 
provision of the European directive of 2009. This clause allows Member States to impose public 
service obligations on undertakings operating in the electricity sector. These obligations may 
relate, among others, to security of supply and to regularity, quality and price of supplies. 
Moreover, Member States will use this prerogative (which constitutes an exception to free 
market) as long as end-users’ right to get access to electricity of a specified quality at reasonable 
prices is in danger.  
In this sense, opening the retail market to competition would expose end-users to price 
volatility. Accordingly, most of the Member States dislike it, since it could deprive some 
consumers of getting access to electricity. For example, think of periods of peak demand, when 
the increase in electricity prices could prevent some end-users of affording this commodity. 
Importantly, this perception is even stronger in countries where, traditionally, electric utilities 
have belonged to the State for many years (public ownership). Therefore, most of the Member 
States prefer to regulate retail prices. In fact, this can explain why the degree of implementation 
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of the European directives (and so the degree of liberalization of the electricity market) varies 
from country to country.  
Consequently, national markets are not equally competitive; neither is there much cross-border 
competition. Thus, we don’t have an integrated and fully competitive electricity market that 
could offer new business opportunities, efficiency gains, price competition –as electricity is a 
homogeneous product–, higher standards of service and security of supply. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. The determinants of electricity price volatility.   
Precisely, as aforementioned, the high volatility of electricity price constitutes the main concern 
of States when deciding whether to open or not the retail market to competition. They want to 
assure that all end-users will get access to electricity to ensure that they won’t be victims of 
price fluctuation.  
Thus, with price volatility being the main cause of retail market regulation, we ought to study 
the determinants of such fluctuation in prices. Importantly, we should add that even though 
price volatility is a common feature of energy markets (oil, gas and electricity markets), this is 
especially relevant for the latter
9
.  
For this purpose, we analyse the behaviour of demand and supply in the electricity market. On 
the one hand, electricity suppliers must ensure that end-users get electricity whenever they need 
it. To be clear, energy security is a State priority. However, we must take into account that 
electricity, due to its physical attributes, cannot be economically stored
10
. Therefore, electricity 
inventories do not exist. Indeed, this implies that there will be a real-time balancing between 
demand and supply, i.e., electricity is produced at the time it is consumed and so it will be 
instantaneously delivered (electricity flows at the speed of light). Consequently, electricity 
suppliers see demand variability as a challenge they have to deal with.  
The only way electricity producers can adjust faster to changes in demand is by means of 
increasing the generation capacity or, at least, increasing the inventories of the fuel used to 
produce electricity. Nevertheless, some observations ought to be made regarding both strategies.  
Firstly, investing in extra generation capacity that would rarely operate is extremely costly for 
firms. Thus, they generally prefer to increase the inventories of the fuel they use to generate 
electricity. However, storage costs shouldn’t be overlooked. As a result, producers’ generation 
capacity remains limited. Moreover, important to note is that the electricity supply cost curve is 
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 Energy Information Administration. US Department of Energy. (2002). Derivatives and Risk 
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Power & Energy Systems 29; p. 690 and Homayoun Boroumand, R., Goutte, S., Porcher, S., and 
Porcher, T. (2015). Hedging strategies in energy markets: The case of electricity retailers. 
Energy Economics 51; p.503. 
steep; in particular, it is “hockey stick” shaped11. That is, as the supply system gets closer to its 
capacity limit, the marginal generation costs escalate rapidly. Consequently, we expect periods 
of peak demand to be characterised by generation constraints and higher production costs.  
In addition, we should bear in mind other factors that can jeopardize an efficient electricity 
provision at reasonable prices to end-users. First, some plant outages can happen; hence 
reducing the supply. Second, in periods of peak demand, the reliability of the physical network 
can be undermined due to congestion of the network. Finally, it may be very difficult to ship 
supplies from areas where prices are low to areas where prices are high, due to the limited 
capability of the physical network connecting customers to suppliers
12
.  On the other hand, some 
remarks ought to be made as regards with the resources companies use in order to generate 
electricity. In this sense, natural gas has been increasingly used
13
. Different reasons explain this: 
first, as electricity is produced when it’s consumed (it cannot be cheaply stored in any 
meaningful quantity), the main cost of production becomes the cost of the fuel used in its 
generation. This includes both the market price of the resource and, for instance, the penalties 
that firms may have to pay when burning such fuel to generate electricity, due to the fact that it 
may cause a number of dioxide emissions that exceeds the cap set up by regulation
14
. In this 
respect, natural gas emits less carbon dioxide than coal or oil and it has become cheaper
15
. 
Second, unlike renewable resources such as solar and wind energy, natural gas allows constant 
supply and, with it, less price volatility. Moreover, power supply from natural gas can be 
adjusted much more quickly than power from other sources
16
. Notwithstanding the preceding 
advantages, it should be noted that natural gas is a resource whose cost could unexpectedly 
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increase due to international political events (e.g. a political crisis with natural gas supply 
countries).  
Turning to the demand side, the first striking feature is that it’s largely driven by weather 
conditions and especially temperature
17
. Furthermore, changes in demand use to happen at each 
hour within the same day
18
. This, combined with its inelasticity, draws up a stochastic pattern. 
To illustrate this, keep in mind that states use to fix retail prices, i.e., the retail price consumers 
see does not vary with the wholesale price of electricity. Therefore, if there is an increase in the 
demand (e.g. due to a change in weather conditions), this will be followed by an increase in 
wholesale prices (as suppliers face some constraints, according to what we stated before), but 
retail prices would not necessarily increase (as they are fixed). Thus, we do not expect 
consumers to respond to changes in wholesale prices, and so the demand will keep on 
increasing and so will the wholesale prices. On the other hand, when there is a decrease in the 
demand, the dynamic is the other way around, i.e., consumers will keep on decreasing the 
demand even if wholesale prices go down. The outcome is that consumers consume too much 
when supplies are stressed and too little when supplies are ample
19
. Furthermore, electricity 
cannot be substituted in the short term for other products.  
Once we have pointed out the determinants of electricity price volatility, both from the supply 
and demand sides, we may consider to what extent derivatives and, in particular, options can be 
useful financial tools for managing price fluctuations.  
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IV. Derivatives and options for managing electricity price volatility.  
With the deregulation of the electricity market, i.e., moving away from regulated slow-moving 
prices to deregulated fluctuating prices, a financial market emerged for this commodity, though 
it is not as significant as in the petroleum and natural gas industries
20
.  
In the financial market, as opposed to the physical market, no physical energy transactions are 
involved. This is a market where several financial instruments are provided (e.g. options) to 
offset (“hedge”) the particular sources of risk in the electricity market (e.g. price volatility)21.  
To this end, as we anticipated, we are especially interested in ascertaining the usefulness of 
derivatives and, in particular, options as financial instruments with whom manage the high price 
volatility of electricity. In this sense, they may constitute an alternative to other risk 
management strategies which do not involve derivative contracts and that, sometimes, might not 
be adequate or affordable. For example, diversification – understood as investing in a variety of 
unrelated businesses – can be effective for reducing a firm’s dependence on the performance of 
a particular industry (e.g. in our case, the electricity industry). However, diversification is 
expensive and therefore small and medium-sized firms cannot afford it. Moreover, it often fails 
because of the complexity of managing diverse businesses
22
.  
Turning to derivatives (and options), we provide a definition of them in order to find out why 
these financial instruments might be effective tools for mitigating exposure to electricity price 
risk.  
In this sense, derivatives are financial instruments (contracts) that do not represent ownership 
rights in any asset but, rather, derive their value from the value of some underlying commodity -
– in our case, electricity –. In addition, options are a specific kind of derivative contract that 
gives the buyer of the contract the right to buy (a call option) or sell (a put option) – in our case, 
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4 and 15. 
electricity – at a specified price (the “strike price”) over a specified period of time. 
Consequently, a call option sets a price ceiling, whereas a put option sets a floor price. 
Moreover, when producers fear that a current profitable margin (or spread between their input 
and output prices) will disappear, they can “lock” it by means of a spread option – in our case, a 
spark spread option
23
 –.  
At this point, the difference between American and European options is that the former allows 
the buyer to exercise his right at any time until the option expires, while European options can 
be exercised only at maturity. In any case, the buyer of the option pays for it in advance for the 
price protection they desire. Furthermore, we can expect the option’s price to be more expensive 
when the terms are more favourable to the buyer and the longer its lifespan.    
On the other hand, even though these options can be sold either on an exchange or on the over-
the-counter (OTC) market, the majority of transactions occur in the OTC market
24
. In this sense, 
the OTC market offers the counterparties the possibility to negotiate option terms (e.g. price and 
maturity), whereas exchange-traded options are standard and inflexible, i.e., in our case, all 
options for electricity and a particular date are the same. Nevertheless, because OTC options are 
entered on a principal-to-principal basis (by means of direct contact between two parties or 
contact mediated by a broker), each counterparty is exposed to the credit risk of the opposite 
party. Overall, counterparties in the electricity financial market prioritize customization over 
liquidity and credit assurances
25
.  
Options are sold by speculators capable to absorb price fluctuations. They will do so as long as 
they believe that it’s profitable for them. For this purpose, they exploit information 
inefficiencies, mispriced instruments and their higher risk capacity. Consequently, the presence 
of speculators, who try to benefit from the unwillingness of electricity suppliers to deal with 
price volatility, is crucial for the existence of financial electricity markets.  
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Furthermore, we should point out why electricity suppliers are so interested in covering against 
price fluctuations by means of options. First, the electricity industry is capital intensive, i.e., if 
firms want to enter into the market, they will have to face significant investments. Therefore, the 
will only do so as long as the expected generated cash overcomes the costs of the investment. In 
this sense, price volatility aggregates uncertainty to the cash-flows electric companies expect to 
receive. In turn, this implies that fewer firms will be willing to enter into the market, lessening 
competition and energy security. To illustrate this, keep in mind the negative shocks faced by 
retailers and generators of electricity
26
.  
On the one hand, retailers are in financial distress either when demand is high or when demand 
is low. In the first case, i.e., periods of peak demand, this is due to the fact that supply and 
demand’s features entail an increase in wholesale prices, while retail prices are, in general, 
fixed. In the second case, i.e., periods of minimum demand, they face liquidity problems 
because the sales volume is too low to cover fixed costs.  
On the other hand, generators are in financial distress when demand is low, since both the price 
and the volume are low (remember that consumers do not respond to changes in wholesale 
prices, due to the fact retail prices remain fixed).  
Consequently, price volatility is associated with financial risks for electricity suppliers. 
Ultimately, this can end up with bankruptcies (and so lower energy supply). For this reason, we 
suggest that options can be welfare enhancing
27
. At least two reasons support it.  
First, they allow perfect risk transfer from electricity suppliers to speculators. For instance, 
retailers usually have to deal with flexible consumer contracts, i.e., consumers can decide the 
volume of electricity they want to consume in each moment. Therefore, there can be a sudden 
increase in the demand. In this case, retailers who purchase call options will know which is the 
maximum price (ceiling price) they will have to pay for additional electricity; the speculator will 
pay the difference between the market price and the “strike price”.  
Another example is the case electricity producers, who want to assure profitable margins by 
means of spark spread options. These cross-commodity options pay out the difference between 
                                                             
26
 Willems, B. and Morbee, J. (2010). Market completeness: How options affect hedging and 
investments in the electricity sector. Energy Economics; p.792. 
27 Willems, B. and Morbee, J. (2010). Market completeness: How options affect hedging and 
investments in the electricity sector. Energy Economics; p.786. 
the price of electricity sold by the generator and the price of the fuels used to generate it
28
. Thus, 
they allow electricity producers to “lock” a specific margin in the event of lower demand.  
Second, if electricity suppliers can transfer the financial risks associated with price volatility, 
they will face less financial distress and they will enjoy more cash-flow stability. Therefore, 
electricity suppliers will have more incentives to invest in this industry, fostering competition in 
the market. Moreover, this might bring about more efficient activities at lower prices. 
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V. . The European Commission’s further deregulation of the energy market (focus on the 
electricity market). 
 We have already mentioned that the goal of the European directives in the electricity sector was 
to achieve a single and competitive energy market. To this end, they encouraged Member States 
to fully deregulate their domestic electricity markets. Nonetheless, and even though there has 
been a trend towards less public ownership of electricity assets and less price regulation, the 
reality is that in 2013 around 15 EU Member States still regulated end-user prices for 
electricity
29
; the liberalisation and integration of the retail energy market are still not complete
30
.  
For many years, these States have based their regulation of retail prices on the prerogative 
attributed by the European directives. According to this right, they can impose on undertakings 
operating in the electricity sector the price of supplies if consumers’ access to electricity is in 
danger. Precisely, fixing retail prices is a method to prevent vulnerable consumers from being 
deprived of electricity consumption in periods of peak demand (when the price rises). 
Moreover, it should be added that consumers prefer to stabilize or smooth their budgets. In this 
sense, avoiding price fluctuation is a way to do so.    
Nevertheless, the European Commission has recently restated the advantages of deregulating the 
retail market in his Communication of 15
th
 July 2015
31
. On the one hand, it will foster 
investments in low-cost supply capacities. This is due to the fact that electricity is a 
homogenous product, and so it’s highly subject to price competition. Therefore, consumers will 
benefit from lower prices; they will have the right to shop around for the best energy deal.  
On the other hand, it will improve the real-time balancing between demand and supply, since 
there will be less demand peaks. This is because deregulation of prices increases demand’s 
response or elasticity. That is, in periods of peak demand, consumers will experience increases 
in retail prices and so they will adjust their consumption as prices evolve. In turn, this implies 
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that there will be less price volatility in the wholesale market. Furthermore, the European 
Commission has proposed to further improve demand’s response by means of, first, lower 
network charges for consumers who reduce their consumption when the network is congested 
(though consumers unable to shift their demand must not be penalized) and, second, via 
provision of information regarding the costs and levels of energy consumption to end-users (so 
as they can change their habits).  
However, two conditions must hold in order to ensure competition in the retail market and, at 
the same time, that vulnerable consumers will not be deprived from electricity. As regards with 
truly competition among suppliers, we need both many suppliers and the possibility to switch 
between them easily and quickly (e.g. being provided with transparent and directly comparable 
offers and not being hampered with switching fees).  
Finally, and turning to vulnerable consumers, who may be at the wrong end of price fluctuation, 
the European Commission has acknowledged the need to protect them. Nevertheless, it doesn’t 
believe that this has to be done by means of fixing retail prices permanently. Accordingly, 
Member States should take care of vulnerable consumers through national social welfare 
systems, since vulnerability of consumers typically does not refer to energy consumption only.  
Moreover, if Member States want to use their prerogative to impose the price of supplies on 
undertakings operating in the electricity sector (so as to guarantee electricity access to 
vulnerable consumers), they ought to do so according to the ruling of the Court of Justice. That 
is, imposition of supply prices needs to be limited in duration and should not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the objective pursued. For instance, prices could be regulated in order to 
limit the impact of the increase in the price of fuel that would in the absence of intervention 
have had a major impact on the sale price offered to final customers. The regulation, however, 
should be limited only to the price component influenced by the specific circumstances, but not 
the final end-user’s price32. 
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VI. Introduction to options with random strikes and spread options.    
In this paper we study options with random strikes, such as two-asset spread options. So let us 
consider a spread option with a pay-off given by: 
          –    –    , (1.1) 
where    and    denote the prices of two underlying assets and have the following form: 
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            , (1.2.2) 
where    and   
  are the initial prices for the underlying assets,    and    denote the volatility 
parameters of    and   
  respectively and   is the correlation. K is a constant called the strike 
price, T is the time parameter and r is our risk-free interest rate, which is r = 0. 
In this case, after describing the energy markets and the role played by spread options in these, 
we will introduce different option pricing solutions.  
This introductory section is followed by three sections that delve into the different option 
pricing techniques. In the first section we will introduce the Margrabe’s formula used to price 
the spread options in the case K = 0. The second section will address the issue of lack of an 
analytical formula, when K is not 0. In this case an approximation exists, called Kirk’s 
Approximation.  
In the third section, we show the recent developments of the option pricing approximation and 
most importantly the Modified Kirk’s Approximation, which gives better results the Kirk’s 
formula, for correlations that are close to 1. Finally in the fourth section we will develop a 
program that will help study numerically the Modified Kirk’s Approximation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII. Margrabe’s formulation and Kirk’s Approximation 
William Margrabe, in his seminal work
33
 
34
, published in 1978, exposed a formula that gave an 
explicit solution for calculating the option price when K is 0, which is a constant and can be 
called as the strike price. This way, Margrabe developed an equation to price an option to 
exchange one risky asset for another. The general Magrabe’s formula follows as this: 
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 , (2.3)  
where      denotes the cumulative standard normal density function,    and   
  are the initial 
prices for the underlying assets,   is the volatility parameter of Magrabe’s Formula,    and    
denote the volatility parameters of    and   
  respectively and   is the correlation.  
As we have said earlier, Margrabe’s formula is an analytical solution for the case when our K is 
0, but in the case when K is different from 0 no explicit solution exists. In the latter case, when 
our K is different from 0, there exist some approximations, being Kirk’s formula the most 
popular one. 
Ewan Kirk
35
, in 1995, introduced a simple but powerful approximation technique for spread 
option valuation that we know today as the Kirk’s formula. Its main advantage is that it can be 
applied to spread option pricing when our K is small. 
Also, another important advantage is that it doesn’t bear the computational costs that bear the 
Monte Carlo simulations. As we will see it is a modification of the original Black-Scholes 
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formula, with an introduction of a different expression of the parameter  , which we will refer 
to as   . The Kirk’s Approximation can be defined as: 
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             (3.3.2) 
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where    and   
  are the initial prices for the underlying assets,    denotes the volatility 
parameter of Kirk’s Approximation,    and    denote the volatility parameters of    and   
  
respectively,    is the correlation, K is a constant called the strike price, T is the time parameter, 
which is T = 1,      denotes the cumulative standard normal density function and r is our risk-
free interest rate, which is r = 0. 
. As we commented previously, the Kirk’s Approximation is a useful tool and can be applied to 
spread option pricing when our K is small or takes a 0 value (because in a sense, Margrabe’s 
formulation is special case of Kirk’s Approximation, matching its results with those of 
Margrabe’s). The approximation starts to fail and problems arise when   is close to 1.  
In the energy markets, it is very usual to encounter situations where the correlations are very 
high, being typical examples the price of crude oil and the price of refined oil, the price of 
natural gas and the price of electric power. Hence it is imperious to find an improvement of the 
approximation in the cases when   is close to 1, which we will discuss in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIII. Modified Kirk’s Approximation. 
Elisa Alòs Alcalde and Jorge Alberto León Vázquez, in 2016, introduced a modification
36
 for 
the Kirk’s Approximation formula. The authors, based on Malliavin calculus, arrive to a result 
that can be applied to spread option pricing when K is different from 0 and more importantly 
when   is close to 1, improving this way Kirk’s Approximation formula. The Modified Kirk’s 
Approximation is defined this way: 
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where    and   
  are the initial prices for the underlying assets,    denotes the volatility 
parameter for the Modified Kirk’s Approximation,    and    denote the volatility parameters of 
   and   
  respectively,    is the correlation, and K is a constant called the strike price.  
Also, the     is an approximation of the implied volatility that takes into account its skew, which 
in turn depends on the    , the T is the time parameter, which is T = 1,      denotes the 
cumulative standard normal density function and r is our risk-free interest rate, which is r = 0. 
By means of modifying the volatility parameter in the Kirk’s Approximation, the authors have 
                                                             
36
 Alòs, E., & León, J. A. (2015). On the short-maturity behaviour of the implied volatility skew 
for random strike options and applications to option pricing approximation. Quantitative 
Finance, 16(1), 31-42. doi:10.1080/14697688.2015.1013499. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14697688.2015.1013499. 
 
achieved an approximation that is still easy and simple to apply, but is more accurate. This 
modification of the Kirk’s Approximation formula is a highly improved technique that can be 
applied to spread option pricing when our when K is different from 0 and more importantly 
when   is close to 1. The improvement yields significantly lower errors than the original Kirk’s 
formula, but in the paper there are few numerical examples that study the goodness of fit of the 
new formula, for that reason we will address this issue in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IX. Modified Kirk’s Approximation’s numerical simulations. 
In this section we will widen the scope of the paper discussed in the last section, for that reason 
we have developed a program, using the mathematical and statistical language R, which will 
allow us to study the goodness of fit of the Modified Kirk’s Approximation in different 
scenarios.  
With this objective in mind, first of all, because the paper published by Alòs and León had 
relatively few trials (namely, n = 1,000,000 trials) we have performed a Monte Carlo simulation 
to simulate the spreads, with n = 5,000,000 trials, in order to obtain much more reliable and 
robust results. We have to explain that the Monte Carlo simulations
37
 are generally numerically 
more efficient than the other procedures when there are three or more stochastic variables; 
because the computational time to perform a Monte Carlo simulation increases approximately 
linearly with the number of variables that we add, while for other procedures it increases 
exponentially.  
Besides this, there are three more advantages to a Monte Carlo simulation, namely, it can 
calculate the standard error for the estimates, it can accommodate pay-offs and stochastic 
processes of varying complexity, and it can also be used when the pay-off depends on a function 
of the whole path followed by a variable and not just its terminal value. 
In order to perform this, first we simulated two Brownian motions, with n = 5,000,000 trials for 
each value, with mean 0 and a standard deviation of 1. 
n = (5000000) 
W = rnorm(n,mean=0,sd=1) 
Z = rnorm(n,mean=0,sd=1) 
 
 
We also chose         , and after obtaining two different simulations our Brownians, namely 
X and Z, we were able to obtain a third value, B, in such way that X and B, would be correlated, 
with the following formula: 
                (5.1) 
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In the next step we simulated our spreads with each value, wrote the pay-off form and found the 
mean of the pay-off for a specific scenario, which is K = 5, time is T = 0.5, interest rate r = 0, 
      ,    = 0.2 and the initial value of the asset       . The following piece of code 
achieves this purpose. 
##Here we introduce the inputs for S1 
##inputs: 
r=0; sigma1 =0.3; T=0.5; n=5000000; S0_1=100; 
S1 = S0_1 * exp((r -(sigma1^2)/2)  * T + sigma1 * sqrt(T) * W) 
##Here we introduce the inputs for S2 
##inputs: 
r=0; sigma2 =0.2; T=0.5; n=5000000; S0_2=100; 
S2 = S0_2 * exp((r -(sigma2^2)/2) * T + sigma2 * sqrt(T) * B) 
##Here we calculate max(S^1(T) - S^2(T) - 0, 0) 
S3 = pmax(S1 - S2 - K, 0) 
S3_K0mean = mean(S3) 
S3_K0mean 
 
 
After, we performed a method of the reduction of the variance. These procedures of reduction of 
the variance are very important in this case, in order to obtain much more reliable and robust 
results, than those presented in the paper by Alòs and León. We have to remember, that if we 
simulate the stochastic processes for the variables underlying a derivative, as indicated in the 
equations (1.2.1) and (1.2.2) we will need a very large number of trials to estimate the value of 
the spread options with accuracy. A problem arises, which is the very high computational cost. 
To decrease and save computational time, we have performed a method of reduction of the 
variance.  
This was achieved by the antithetic variables technique
38
. This involves obtaining two values of 
the derivative. The first value    is calculated as described above; the second value   
  is 
calculated by changing the sign of all the random samples from the standard normal 
distributions. So if        are the samples to calculate values    and   , then this same sample 
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is used to calculate   
  and   
 . In the way the sample value of the derivative calculated from a 
simulation trial is the average of    and   
 .  
Theoretically, this performs exceptionally well, because we know when one value is above the 
true value, the other is below, and this works the other way too. We can denote    as the average 
of    and   
 : 
     
     
 
 
 (5.2) 
After we can obtain the final estimate of the value of the derivative with the average of the   . 
Finally we can obtain the standard error of the estimate, which has the following form: 
 
  
, (5.3)  
where   is the standard deviation of the    and  is the number of simulation trials (the numerb 
of pairs of values calculated). This techniques allows us to obtain a standard error calculated 
using    random trials. So after obtaining the antithetic variables, we repeated the above steps, 
which included the simulation of our spreads with each value, writing the pay-off form and 
finding the mean of the pay-off in the case when the K = 0.  
##Here we calculate max(S^1(T) - S^2(T) - 0, 0) 
invS3 = pmax(invS1 - invS2 - K, 0) 
invS3_K0mean = mean(invS3) 
invS3_K0mean 
 
 
The final step, involved the calculation the mean of our obtained spreads, observing effectively 
a drop in our standard deviation. The following R code achieves this result. 
 
 
 
 
Once obtained the results we continue to the next step, which is performing the Kirk’s 
Approximation commented above, in the following piece of R code. 
S3_total_mean = (S3_K0mean + invS3_K0mean) / 2 
S3_total_mean 
 
##Here we add Kirk's approximation for spread option prices 
##Here we calculate our volatility 
a_kirk = sqrt( (sigma1)^2 - 2*rho*sigma1*sigma2 * (S0_2/(S0_2 + K)) + (sigma2)^2 * 
((S0_2/(S0_2 + K))^2) ) 
##Here we calculate our d1 and d2 
S = (S0_1 / (S0_2 + K)) 
d1 = (log(S, base = exp(1)) + 1/2 * (a_kirk^2) * T) / ( a_kirk * (sqrt(T)) ) 
d2 = d1 - a_kirk * sqrt(T) 
##Here we use the above calculations to approximate the call spread using Kirk's formula 
N_d1 = pnorm(d1,mean=0,sd=1) 
N_d2 = pnorm(d2,mean=0,sd=1) 
C_kirk = (exp(-r*T)) * ( (S0_1*N_d1) - ((S0_2 + K) * N_d2) ) 
C_kirk 
 
 
After obtaining our results of the approximation, now we can finally do the Modified Kirk’s 
Approximation that we discussed in the third section, with the following code in R. 
##Here we add Modified Kirk's approximation for spread option prices 
##Here we calculate our volatility 
a_kirk = sqrt( (sigma1)^2 - 2*rho*sigma1*sigma2 * (S0_2/(S0_2 + K)) + (sigma2)^2 * 
((S0_2/(S0_2 + K))^2) ) 
X_t = log(S0_1, base = exp(1)) 
x_aster = log((S0_2 + K), base = exp(1)) 
I_t = sqrt(a_kirk^2) + 1/2 * (( (sigma2 * S0_2/(S0_2 + K)) - rho* sigma1)^2 ) *  
( 1 / ((sqrt(a_kirk^2))^3) ) *(sigma2^2) * ( (S0_2 * K) / ((S0_2 + K)^2) ) * (X_t - x_aster) 
##Here we calculate our d1 and d2 
S = (S0_1 / (S0_2 + K)) 
d1_modif = (log(S, base = exp(1)) + 1/2 * (I_t^2) * T) / (I_t * (sqrt(T)) ) 
d2_modif = d1_modif - I_t * sqrt(T) 
 
  
Here we include the confidence interval tables with some examples to illustrate that our 
numerical method has worked perfectly. The confidence intervals were obtained as usually and 
the following are the results: 
Confidence Intervals               
    (2.357551, 2.363762) (1.273913, 1.278092 ) 
     (1.26478, 1.269644) (0.5398617, 0.5427516) 
 
Here we clearly can observe that the intervals are too narrow, giving us a clear indication that 
our numerical method performed effectively. If we compare these results with the results we 
obtained for Kirk’s Approximation and Modified Kirk’s Approximation we can confirm clearly 
that our numerical method performed positively. Here we present some examples of the Kirk’s 
Approximation results: 
Kirk’s Approximation               
    2.3647228 1.2862590 
     1.2745318 0.5615868 
 
And also some examples of the Modified Kirk’s Approximation results: 
Modified Kirk’s Approximation               
    2.3626873 1.27686463 
     1.2681347 0.54140923 
 
##Here we use the above calculations to approximate the call spread using Modified Kirk's 
formula 
N_d1_modif = pnorm(d1_modif,mean=0,sd=1) 
N_d2_modif = pnorm(d2_modif,mean=0,sd=1) 
C_kirk_modif = (exp(-r*T)) * ( (S0_1*N_d1_modif) - ((S0_2 + K) * N_d2_modif) ) 
C_kirk_modif 
 
The results presented here indicate us that in the cases when correlations are small, the Kirk’s 
Approximation and the Modified Kirk’s Approximation fall into the confidence intervals 
presented above, because at this level the Kirk’s results are consistent. But as our correlations 
grow we can observe that Kirk’s Approximation fails and falls out of the confidence intervals 
and only the Modified Kirk’s Approximation stay within the confidence intervals, indicating us 
the reliability of this new method. 
The following step involved obtaining the errors of the two approximations in relation to our 
original Monte Carlo simulation, with the following code. 
##Here we calculate the errors of the Kirk and Modified Kirk's formulas 
error_Kirk = ((C_kirk * 100) / S3_total_mean) - 100 
error_Kirk 
error_Kirk_modif = ((C_kirk_modif * 100) / S3_total_mean) - 100 
error_Kirk_modif 
 
  
As we stated previously, the above simulations were performed with a K = 5 and with a 
   0    .  
Being our main objective to widen the numerical examples to be able to study more thoroughly 
the results of the Modified Kirk’s Approximation, we replicated the process described above 
with for a wide range of values of K and  . We chose a range of K from 0 to 20 and for   we 
chose 5 values that are 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95 and 0.999.  
Once obtained the results of the simulations, first we calculated the errors produced by the 
Kirk’s Approximation in relation to the Monte Carlo simulation and secondly we computed the 
errors produced by the Modified Kirk’s Approximation in relation to the Monte Carlo 
simulation. The following figures of the plots describe our results. 
 Figure 1. Here   = 0.80. The errors are in % 
terms of the benchmark (Monte-Carlo 
simulations). 
 Figure 2. Here   = 0.85. The errors are in % 
terms of the benchmark (Monte-Carlo 
simulations). 
 Figure 3. Here   = 0.90. The errors are in % 
terms of the benchmark (Monte-Carlo 
simulations). 
Figure 4. Here   = 0.95. The errors are in % 
terms of the benchmark (Monte-Carlo 
simulations). 
 
 Figure 5. Here   = 0.999. The errors are in % 
terms of the benchmark (Monte-Carlo 
simulations). 
 
As we can observe in the above figures, for example in Figure 5, with each increment in the 
value of   and in the value of K the errors of the Kirk’s Approximation start taking an 
exponential shape. The contrary happened to the Modified Kirk’s Approximation, because we 
can clearly devise that even if the values of   and K surge, the errors of the approximation in 
relation to the Monte Carlo simulations remain constant, except in the case of Figure 1.  
This is one of the main advantages of the Modified Kirk’s Approximation, because it allows, 
like the Kirk’s Approximation, a fast computation of the spreads, without the great 
computational cost that can impose a Monte Carlo simulation with an important number of 
trials. 
As we noted earlier, the previous computations were made, using a value of T = 0.5. To achieve 
a more complete image of our performance we have also performed the same set of calculations, 
but with different values of T. We chose 5 values that are 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5. The 
following figures of the surface plots would describe our results. 
Figure 6. Here   = 0.1. The errors are in % 
terms of the benchmark (Monte-Carlo 
simulations). 
Figure 7. Here   = 0.2. The errors are in % 
terms of the benchmark (Monte-Carlo 
simulations). 
Figure 8. Here   = 0.3. The errors are in % 
terms of the benchmark (Monte-Carlo 
simulations). 
Figure 9. Here   = 0.4. The errors are in % 
terms of the benchmark (Monte-Carlo 
simulations). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Here   = 0.5. The errors are in % 
terms of the benchmark (Monte-Carlo 
simulations). 
 
As in our previous cases, we can clearly observe in the figures of the surface plots, with each 
increment in the value of T, the values of  , and in the values of K the errors of the Kirk’s 
Approximation start spiking and ultimately take an exponential shape. As before happened to 
the Modified Kirk’s Approximation, because we can clearly observe that even if the values of T, 
 , and K surge, the errors of the approximation in relation to the Monte Carlo simulations 
remain constant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X. Conclusions. 
After reviewing the relatively young energy markets (and especially the electricity markets) and 
its regulatory framework we can ascertain that these new frontiers need innovative methods to 
manage the energy price risk. The two-asset and three-asset spread options are a natural choice, 
given that they enable the possibility to hedge the risk with a relatively low cost. We have seen 
that the Kirk’s Approximation of the pricing of these options was a great breakthrough for 
financial mathematics field, because of its simplicity and accuracy. Alas, it was flawed in the 
cases of very high correlations, which is a very natural assumption in the energy markets. 
Hence, more advanced and innovative methods are needed to manage the new uncertainties 
posed by these new products. For that reason, the Modification of the Kirk’s Formula is a great 
answer to that need, because by modifying the volatility parameters of the original formula 
posed by Kirk, the authors have achieved a simple, easy to apply and accurate solution to 
approximate spread option prices with a high correlation parameter. 
This paper’s particular task was reviewing and assessing the goodness of fit of this new method 
by performing more simulations than those presented in the original paper by Alòs and León
39
, 
and by studying more scenarios. The simulations performed exceptionally well in the cases with 
a high correlation parameter and the results presented here ascertain that. We can clearly see 
that the Modified Kirk’s Approximation method greatly reduces the errors in percentage terms 
of the Monte-Carlo simulation, unlike the Kirk’s original method. Moreover the confidence 
intervals also show the goodness of fit of this new method, giving us a second confirmation, 
besides the figures presented in the paper, that the method is extremely accurate. 
To say that this is the end of the road would be simple, simplistic and, even worse anachronistic. 
As the financial markets evolve and become even more sophisticated, new markets emerge and 
innovative products are created, more than ever before, advanced methods are needed to 
progress the field of quantitative finance and to push the boundaries even more. 
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XII. Annex. 
##Here we will add Kirk's approximation  
##and the Modified Kirk's approximation for spread option prices, but with a different K and 
rho 
##Here we create a matrix for rho, with 21 rows, 1 column and 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95, 0.999 
values 
matrix_rho <- matrix(c(0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95, 0.999), nrow = 5, ncol = 1) 
##Here we create a function that will evaluate our formula 
function_S3_K_rho<-function(rho){ 
##Here we simulate our Brownians 
n = (5000000) 
W = rnorm(n,mean=0,sd=1) 
Z = rnorm(n,mean=0,sd=1) 
##Here we find the correlation between W and Z 
##rho = cor(W, Z) 
##rho = 0.999 
##Here we calculate B, so W and B can have same correlation 
B = (rho * W + (sqrt(1-(rho^2))) * Z) 
 
##Here we simulate our spreads 
##Here we introduce the inputs for S1 
##inputs: 
r=0; sigma1=0.3; T=0.5; n=5000000; S0_1=100; 
S1 = S0_1 * exp((r -(sigma1^2)/2)  * T + sigma1 * sqrt(T) * W) 
 
##Here we introduce the inputs for S2 
##inputs: 
r=0; sigma2=0.2; T=0.5; n=5000000; S0_2=100; 
S2 = S0_2 * exp((r -(sigma2^2)/2) * T + sigma2 * sqrt(T) * B) 
 
## Here we invert our W and B values 
invW = W * (-1) 
invZ = Z * (-1) 
invB = (rho * invW + (sqrt(1-(rho^2))) * invZ) 
##Here we simulate our spreads 
##Here we introduce the inputs for invS1 
##inputs: 
r=0; sigma1=0.3; T=0.5; n=5000000; S0_1=100; 
invS1 = S0_1 * exp((r -(sigma1^2)/2)  * T + sigma1 * sqrt(T) * invW) 
##Here we introduce the inputs for invS2 
##inputs: 
r=0; sigma2=0.2; T=0.5; n=5000000; S0_2=100; 
invS2 = S0_2 * exp((r -(sigma2^2)/2) * T + sigma2 * sqrt(T) * invB) 
 
##Here we create a matrix for K, with 21 rows, 1 column and values from 0 to 20 
matrix_K <- matrix(c(0:20), nrow = 21, ncol = 1) 
##Here we create a function that will evaluate our formula 
function_S3_K <- function(K){ 
##Here we calculate max(S^1(T) - S^2(T) - 0, 0) 
S3 = pmax(S1 - S2 - K, 0) 
S3_mean = mean(S3) 
S3_mean 
##Here we calculate max(S^1(T) - S^2(T) - 0, 0) 
invS3 = pmax(invS1 - invS2 - K, 0) 
invS3_mean = mean(invS3) 
invS3_mean 
S3_total_mean = (S3_mean + invS3_mean) / 2 
S3_total_mean 
}  
 
##Here we apply the matrix_K_rho values to our function_total_S3 to be evaluated 
results_function_S3_K = apply(matrix_K, 1, function(x) function_S3_K(x) ) 
} 
results_function_S3_K_rho = apply(matrix_rho, 1, function(x) function_S3_K_rho(x) ) 
results_function_S3_K_rho 
##Here we add Kirk's approximation for spread option prices 
##Here we create a matrix for rho, with 21 rows, 1 column and 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95, 0.999 
values 
matrix_rho <- matrix(c(0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95, 0.999), nrow = 5, ncol = 1) 
 
##Here we create a function that will evaluate our formula 
function_Kirk_K_rho<-function(rho){ 
##Here we create a matrix for K, with 21 rows, 1 column and values from 0 to 20 
matrix_K <- matrix(c(0:20), nrow = 21, ncol = 1) 
##Here we create a function that will evaluate our formula 
function_Kirk_K<-function(K){ 
##Here we calculate our volatility 
##inputs: 
r=0; sigma1=0.3; T=0.5; S0_1=100; 
r=0; sigma2=0.2; T=0.5; S0_2=100; 
a_kirk = sqrt( (sigma1)^2 - 2*rho*sigma1*sigma2 * (S0_2/(S0_2 + K)) + (sigma2)^2 * 
((S0_2/(S0_2 + K))^2) ) 
##Here we calculate our d1 and d2 
S = (S0_1 / (S0_2 + K)) 
d1 = (log(S, base = exp(1)) + 1/2 * (a_kirk^2) * T) / ( a_kirk * (sqrt(T)) ) 
d2 = d1 - a_kirk * sqrt(T) 
##Here we use the above calculations to approximate the call spread using Kirk's formula 
N_d1 = pnorm(d1,mean=0,sd=1) 
N_d2 = pnorm(d2,mean=0,sd=1) 
C_kirk = (exp(-r*T)) * ( (S0_1*N_d1) - ((S0_2 + K) * N_d2) ) 
C_kirk 
}  
##Here we apply the matrix_K_rho to our function_Kirk to be evaluated 
results_function_Kirk_K = apply(matrix_K, 1, function(x) function_Kirk_K(x) ) 
} 
results_function_Kirk_K_rho = apply(matrix_rho, 1, function(x) function_Kirk_K_rho(x) ) 
results_function_Kirk_K_rho 
 
 
##Here we add Modified Kirk's approximation for spread option prices 
##Here we create a matrix for rho, with 21 rows, 1 column and 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95, 0.999 
values 
matrix_rho <- matrix(c(0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95, 0.999), nrow = 5, ncol = 1) 
##Here we create a function that will evaluate our formula 
function_Kirk_modif_K_rho<-function(rho){ 
##Here we create a matrix for K, with 21 rows, 1 column and values from 0 to 20 
matrix_K <- matrix(c(0:20), nrow = 21, ncol = 1) 
##Here we create a function that will evaluate our formula 
function_Kirk_modif_K <- function(K){ 
##Here we calculate our volatility 
##inputs: 
r=0; sigma1=0.3; T=0.5; S0_1=100; 
r=0; sigma2=0.2; T=0.5; S0_2=100; 
a_kirk = sqrt( (sigma1)^2 - 2*rho*sigma1*sigma2 * (S0_2/(S0_2 + K)) + (sigma2)^2 * 
((S0_2/(S0_2 + K))^2) ) 
X_t = log(S0_1, base = exp(1)) 
x_aster = log((S0_2 + K), base = exp(1)) 
I_t = sqrt(a_kirk^2) + 1/2 * (( (sigma2 * S0_2/(S0_2 + K)) - rho* sigma1)^2 ) * ( 1 / 
((sqrt(a_kirk^2))^3) ) * (sigma2^2) * ( (S0_2 * K) / ((S0_2 + K)^2) ) * (X_t - x_aster) 
S = (S0_1 / (S0_2 + K)) 
d1_modif = (log(S, base = exp(1)) + 1/2 * (I_t^2) * T) / (I_t * (sqrt(T)) ) 
d2_modif = d1_modif - I_t * sqrt(T) 
N_d1_modif = pnorm(d1_modif,mean=0,sd=1) 
N_d2_modif = pnorm(d2_modif,mean=0,sd=1) 
C_kirk_modif = (exp(-r*T)) * ( (S0_1*N_d1_modif) - ((S0_2 + K) * N_d2_modif) ) 
C_kirk_modif 
}  
##Here we apply the matrix_K_rho values to our function_Kirk_modif to be evaluated 
results_Kirk_modif_K = apply(matrix_K, 1, function(x) function_Kirk_modif_K(x) ) 
} 
results_function_Kirk_modif_K_rho = apply(matrix_rho, 1, function(x) 
function_Kirk_modif_K_rho(x) ) 
results_function_Kirk_modif_K_rho 
results_function_S3_K_rho 
results_function_Kirk_K_rho 
results_function_Kirk_modif_K_rho 
 
##Here we calculate the error produced by the Kirk formula for each rho 
error_Kirk = ((results_function_Kirk_K_rho * 100) / results_function_S3_K_rho) - 100 
colnames(error_Kirk) <- c('rho_0.8', 'rho_0.85','rho_0.9','rho_0.95', 'rho_0.999') 
rownames(error_Kirk) <- c('K0', 'K1', 'K2','K3','K4','K5','K6','K7','K8','K9', 
'K10','K11','K12','K13','K14','K15','K16','K17','K18','K19','K20') 
error_Kirk 
##Here we set and retrieve the current directory  
setwd("~/") 
getwd() 
##Here we save the plot images 
plot(error_Kirk[,'rho_0.8'], type= 'l', xlab="K", ylab='error_Kirk_0.8') 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_rho_0.8.pdf'); 
plot(error_Kirk[,'rho_0.85'], type= 'l', xlab="K", ylab='error_Kirk_0.85') 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_rho_0.85.pdf'); 
plot(error_Kirk[,'rho_0.9'], type= 'l', xlab="K", ylab='error_Kirk_0.9') 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_rho_0.9.pdf'); 
plot(error_Kirk[,'rho_0.95'], type= 'l', xlab="K", ylab='error_Kirk_0.95') 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_rho_0.95.pdf'); 
plot(error_Kirk[,'rho_0.999'], type= 'l', xlab="K", ylab='error_Kirk_0.999') 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_rho_0.999.pdf'); 
dev.off (); 
 
##Here we calculate the error produced by the modified Kirk formula for each rho 
error_Kirk_modif = ((results_function_Kirk_modif_K_rho * 100) /  
results_function_S3_K_rho) - 100 
colnames(error_Kirk_modif) <- c('rho_0.8', 'rho_0.85','rho_0.9','rho_0.95','rho_0.999') 
rownames(error_Kirk_modif) <- c('K0', 'K1', 'K2','K3','K4','K5','K6','K7','K8','K9', 
'K10','K11','K12','K13','K14','K15','K16','K17','K18','K19','K20') 
error_Kirk_modif 
##Here we save the plot images 
plot(error_Kirk_modif[,'rho_0.8'], type= 'l', xlab="K", ylab='error_Kirk_modif_0.8') 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_modif_rho_0.8.pdf'); 
plot(error_Kirk_modif[,'rho_0.85'], type= 'l', xlab="K", ylab='error_Kirk_modif_0.85') 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_modif_rho_0.85.pdf'); 
plot(error_Kirk_modif[,'rho_0.9'], type= 'l', xlab="K", ylab='error_Kirk_modif_0.9') 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_modif_rho_0.9.pdf'); 
plot(error_Kirk_modif[,'rho_0.95'], type= 'l', xlab="K", ylab='error_Kirk_modif_0.95') 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_modif_rho_0.95.pdf'); 
plot(error_Kirk_modif[,'rho_0.999'], type= 'l', xlab="K", ylab='error_Kirk_modif_0.999') 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_modif_rho_0.999.pdf'); 
dev.off (); 
 
##Here we superpose the plot images and we save them 
plot(error_Kirk[,'rho_0.8'],type="l",xlab="K", ylab='error_Kirk_and_error_Kirk_modif_0.8', 
col="red", ylim=c(-0.1, 0.5)) 
lines(error_Kirk_modif[,'rho_0.8'],col="green", ylim=c(-0.5, 0.5)) 
legend('topright', legend=c("Kirk errors", "Modified Kirk errors"), col=c("red", "green"), lty=1, 
cex=0.8) 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_and_error_Kirk_modif_rho_0.8.pdf'); 
plot(error_Kirk[,'rho_0.85'],type="l",xlab="K", ylab='error_Kirk_and_error_Kirk_modif_0.85', 
col="red", ylim=c(-0.2, 0.8)) 
lines(error_Kirk_modif[,'rho_0.85'],col="green", ylim=c(-0.2, 0.8)) 
legend('topright', legend=c("Kirk errors", "Modified Kirk errors"), col=c("red", "green"), lty=1, 
cex=0.8) 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_and_error_Kirk_modif_rho_0.85.pdf'); 
plot(error_Kirk[,'rho_0.9'],type="l",xlab="K", ylab='error_Kirk_and_error_Kirk_modif_0.9', 
col="red", ylim=c(-0.2, 0.7)) 
lines(error_Kirk_modif[,'rho_0.9'],col="green", ylim=c(-0.2, 0.7)) 
legend('topright', legend=c("Kirk errors", "Modified Kirk errors"), col=c("red", "green"), lty=1, 
cex=0.8) 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_and_error_Kirk_modif_rho_0.9.pdf'); 
plot(error_Kirk[,'rho_0.95'],type="l",xlab="K", ylab='error_Kirk_and_error_Kirk_modif_0.95', 
col="red", ylim=c(-0.4, 7)) 
lines(error_Kirk_modif[,'rho_0.95'],col="green", ylim=c(-0.4, 7)) 
legend('topright', legend=c("Kirk errors", "Modified Kirk errors"), col=c("red", "green"), lty=1, 
cex=0.8) 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_and_error_Kirk_modif_rho_0.95.pdf'); 
plot(error_Kirk[,'rho_0.999'],type="l",xlab="K", 
ylab='error_Kirk_and_error_Kirk_modif_0.999', col="red", ylim=c(-0.2, 5)) 
lines(error_Kirk_modif[,'rho_0.999'],col="green", ylim=c(-0.2, 5)) 
legend('topright', legend=c("Kirk errors", "Modified Kirk errors"), col=c("red", "green"), lty=1, 
cex=0.8) 
dev.print(pdf, 'error_Kirk_and_error_Kirk_modif_rho_0.999.pdf'); 
dev.off (); 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
